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I
INTRODUCTION
Even though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' has been in effect
only twenty years, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 2
(hereinafter "the ADEA") only eighteen years, the published decisions
interpreting the Acts are numerous, the unreported cases are extensive, and
the filing of charges and the institution of lawsuits in the federal courts
proceed at an accelerated pace.
Although a number of issues of law have been settled at this time by
appellate rulings, this article focuses on three realities of litigation that have
emerged and that face employers in the 1980's: problems that arise when (1)
a plaintiff claims continuing acts of employment discrimination by the
employer; (2) the plaintiff joins state claims to the federal claims, thereby
increasing the complexity and cost of litigating the main issue; and (3) the
double attorneys' fees and the high cost of litigation produce a chilling effect
on the defendant.
II
CONTINUING VIOLATION
The timely filing of charges and actions continues to present problems for
both plaintiffs and defendants. The ADEA and Title VII place on the plaintiff
the burden of filing a charge of discrimination within 180 days of the date of
the alleged unlawful employment practice (or within 300 days in states with
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antidiscrimination agencies). 3 In addition, the plaintiff must comply with the
statutes of limitations for the filing of private civil actions: under Title VII,
within ninety days of receipt of the "Notice of Right to Sue"; 4 under the
ADEA or the Equal Pay Act,5 (hereinafter "the EPA") within two years of the
alleged violation (three years for a "willful" violation) 6 and, in the case of
ADEA actions, more than sixty days after filing the charge; 7 and under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,8 within the time specified by the "most appropriate"
statute of limitations under state law. 9 Although compliance with these time
limitations is not strictly jurisdictional, failure to comply will force the plaintiff
to demonstrate equitable reasons for tolling the running of the limitations
period.o
From the outset, these procedural requirements have been the subject of
frequent litigation and have been described as a procedural maze and trap for
the unwary plaintiff. To alleviate the harshness resulting from rigid
application of these statutes of limitations, the doctrine of "continuing
violation" has evolved. Because this doctrine revives otherwise stale claims
and usually expands and complicates the litigation, it is of special concern to
employers and the defendants' bar.
A. General Nature of the Theory
The continuing violation theory is most frequently applied in an attempt
to avoid the requirement that a charge be filed within 180 days (although it
may also have application in the timely filing of section 1981, EPA, and other
civil rights actions). The doctrine is most often characterized as a series of
related acts which continue into the 180 day period." Despite numerous
cases invoking this doctrine in a wide variety of fact situations, "the precise
contours and theoretical bases of [this theory] are at best unclear."' 12 The
cases applying this doctrine are appropriately described as "inconsistent and
confusing."' 3
There was speculation that the doctrine of continuing violation had been
largely discarded by the Supreme Court in its decisions in United Air Lines v.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982) (ADEA timeliness provision); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982)
(Title VII timeliness provision).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982) (ADEA statute of limitations), incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982) (EPA statute of limitations), incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a) (1982).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
9. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); see also Annotation, State
Statute of Limitations as Affecting Federal Civil Rights Actions under 42 USCS § 1981, 29 A.L.R. FED. 710,
715 (1976).
10. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
11. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1042-43 (2d ed. 1983).
12. Berry v. Board of Supervisors, 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983).
13. Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 676 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1982); Dumas v. Town
of Mount Vernon, 612 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Evans, 14 Delaware State College v. Ricks, 15 and Chardon v. Fernandez. 16 These
cases prompted one commentator to draw the following conclusion: "The
United States Supreme Court seems to have signaled the demise of the
doctrine of 'continuing violations' in employment discrimination actions."1 7
In Evans, the plaintiff was fired under the defendant's no-marriage rule in
1968. The no-marriage rule was later held to be violative of Title VII. In
1972, plaintiff was rehired. Approximately one year later she filed her charge
of discrimination alleging that she had been wrongfully denied credit for her
seniority from her first period of employment and that this discrimination was
continuing. 18 The Supreme Court held:
Respondent [plaintiff employee] is correct in pointing out that the seniority system
gives present effect to a past act of discrimination. But United [defendant employer]
was entitled to treat that past act as lawful after respondent failed to file a charge of
discrimination within the 90 days then allowed by § 706(d). A discriminatory act
which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a
discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute
relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice
is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which
has no present legal consequences. 19
The Court then rejected plaintiff's suggested application of the continuing
violation theory to these facts, noting that the seniority system had a
continuing impact but that no present violation existed. 20
In Ricks, the plaintiff was informed that he would be denied tenure and
would be awarded the standard one-year termination contract. He
unsuccessfully sought review of the tenure decision through the college's
grievance procedure. Shortly before the end of his one-year terminal
contract, but more than 180 days after being notified that he would be denied
tenure, plaintiff filed his charge of discrimination. 2 1 The Court held that the
limitations period began running on the date plaintiff was informed of the
decision:
In sum, the only alleged discrimination occurred-and the filing limitations periods
therefore commenced-at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated
to Ricks. That is so even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure-the eventual
loss of a teaching position-did not occur until later.22
This conclusion was reaffirmed in Chardon when the Court again stated that
notification of the decision to terminate begins the running of the applicable
statute of limitations, not the actual termination of employment. 23
14. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
15. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
16. 454 U.S. 6 (1981).
17. Jacobs, Employment Discrimination and Continuing Violations: An Update of Ricks and Recent
Decisions, 33 LAB. L.J. 684, 684 (1982).
18. Evans, 431 U.S. at 554-55.
19. Id. at 558.
20. Id.
21. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252-54 (1980).
22. Id. at 258 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
23. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981).
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However, in a subsequent Fair Housing Act case, Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 24 the Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the continuing violation
theory. The Fair Housing Act 25 requires that a civil action be brought within
180 days of the alleged occurrence of a discriminatory practice. 26 In Havens,
two of the three plaintiffs, Coleman and Willis, were testers who "posed as
renters for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering
practices." 27  They and the other plaintiff, Coles, asked the
defendant/apartment owner about the possibility of renting an apartment in
Richmond, Virginia, and were the victims of illegal "steering." 28 Coles was
steered on one occasion within 180 days of the institution of the suit, and
Coleman was steered on earlier occasions, more than 180 days prior to filing
the complaint. 29 The complaint also alleged that Coleman and Willis were
deprived of their right under the Act to truthful housing information when
they were falsely informed that no housing was available (which cause of
action is referred to by the Court as a "tester claim"). 30 All of the tester
claims and steering incidents involving Coleman and Willis occurred more
than 180 days prior to the institution of this action. 31 The district court
dismissed the claims of all plaintiffs except Coles, whose steering claim was
the only event within 180 days of the institution of the action.32 Relying on a
continuing violation theory, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.33
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the allegation of a
continuing steering violation prevented the application of the 180-day statute
of limitations to the steering claims of Willis and Coleman:
Like the Court of Appeals, we therefore conclude that where a plaintiff, pursuant to
the Fair Housing Act, challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act,
but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period, the complaint is
timely filed when it is filed within 180 days of the last asserted occurrence of that
practice .... Plainly the claims, as currently alleged, are based not solely on isolated
incidents involving the two respondents [Willis and Coleman], but a continuing
violation manifested in a number of incidents-including at least one (involving Coles)
that is asserted to have occurred within the 180-day period. 34
However, since the steering event involving Coles did not also involve a tester
claim, the tester claims by Coleman and Willis were barred, there being no
allegation of an occurrence of a tester claim violation within the 180-day
period.35
24. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1982).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1982).
27. 455 U.S. at 373.
28. Racial steering encourages patterns of racial segregation by directing members of racial
groups to housing areas already occupied primarily by members of that group. Id. at 366 n.1.
29. Id. at 368, 380 (Willis was white and consequently was not "steered").
30. Id. at 369, 373-74.
31. Id. at 380.
32. Id. at 369.
33. Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part sub nom. Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
34. 455 U.S. at 380-81 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 381.
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Havens thus clarified two points with regard to the continuing violation
theory: (1) it is still viable, and (2) the plaintiff must allege the existence of an
unlawful practice that has continued into the limitations period, the last
specific occurrence of which must be within the limitations period. Other
than these two points, the decision is of little help to litigants in determining
the nature of the continuing violation theory. For example, it does not assist
in differentiating "isolated incidents" which would be barred under Ricks,
from a "continuing violation manifested by a number of incidents" which
would be actionable under Havens. Disturbingly, the only apparent
requirement is an allegation that the events are not isolated but rather make up
a pattern evidencing a continuing practice.3 6
Arguably, Havens does prevent a plaintiff from reviving a stale claim of one
nature by alleging that it is part of a pattern of discrimination which has been
evidenced within the limitations period by a different form of discrimination.
Permitting a discriminatory termination claim alleged to be part of a pattern
of discrimination against the plaintiff to revive a time-barred failure-to-
promote claim would appear to be inconsistent with Havens.37 Conversely,
however, a failure to promote which has become time-barred could
conceivably be revitalized by a subsequent failure to promote if the court,
through standards which are unclear, concludes that the two are not isolated
events but are a continuing pattern. 38 Even though precisely the same facts
could be involved in defending the first failure to promote in either case, the
policy against litigation of stale claims will not be applied in the second
example, but will be applied to the first.
The problems presented for employers by the continuing violation theory
are self-evident: the theory acts to revive otherwise time-barred claims,
presenting not only the evidentiary problems inherent in the defense of stale
claims, but contributing markedly to the complexity of the litigation, with the
additional delay and cost inherent in complex cases. Events not apparently
significant at the time are quickly forgotten and witnesses depart, or are not
even identifiable. Discovery becomes particularly burdensome; voluminous
interrogatories, directed at a series of now-distant events, attempt to discern
"patterns" by delving into hundreds or thousands of other decisions and
events. Instead of focusing on why, for example, vacancy X was filled by
employee Y rather than the plaintiff, the lawsuit becomes an investigation and
analysis of the employer's employment practice history.
B. Application of the Theory to Back Pay
In addition to clouding and complicating liability issues, the continuing
violation doctrine casts substantial uncertainty over the damages issue. While
Title VII limits back pay liability to a period not more than two years prior to
the filing of a charge, it is unclear what effect will be given to events occurring
36. See id at 380-81.
37. See id. at 381.
38. See, e.g., Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136, 1137 (8th Cir. 1977).
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prior to the back pay period. 39 In Verzosa v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith,40 plaintiff was denied promotions in 1969, 1970, and 1971. After being
denied a promotion again in 1973, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination
and subsequently filed suit.41 The defendant's stipulation to jurisdiction was
an admission that the alleged unlawful practices were a continuing violation. 42
The court found that the plaintiff had been wrongfully denied a promotion in
July 1970 (three years before the charge was filed). Since the charge was filed
in November of 1973, the back pay period extended back only to November
of 1971. "In computing the award, however, the [district] court assumed
appellee would have been promoted in July 1970 and therefore would have
gained more than a year's experience at the time the damage period began
(November 1971)." 43 Therefore, the court concluded the plaintiff should
have been paid at the average rate for similarly experienced employees. 44 Of
necessity, this calculation of back pay takes into account events prior to the two
year back pay period and considers their effect on pay within the back pay
period. Applied in this manner, there is no statute of limitations under the
continuing violation doctrine, but only a cut off of monetary relief for any
period more than two years prior to the charge.
In contrast, in White v. Carolina Paperboard Corp.,45 the court limited the
back pay inquiry to events within the two year statute of limitations. There,
the employer was found to have discriminatorily prevented a class of black
employees from entering a particular line of progression. 46 In order to
determine back pay, the court of appeals instructed the district court to
consider placement opportunities during the back pay period and compare
this "hypothetical" employment history to the class member's actual
employment history.4 7 This approach would not give effect to opportunities
prior to the back pay period, as the Verzosa approach did.
An example of a case in which the continuing violation doctrine presents
both liability and back pay proof problems is Jenkins v. Home Insurance Co.48
Plaintiff was hired in September of 1969 as a claims representative and was
promoted on October 8, 1973, to the position of claims supervisor, in which
position she worked until December 30, 1977, when she retired. She alleged
that in January of 1975 she became aware that she was being paid less than
male counterparts who were performing the same work. On May 3, 1978, she
filed a charge with the EEOC. Thereafter she filed her lawsuit alleging Title
VII and Equal Pay Act violations. The district court granted the employer's
39. See, e.g., O'Keefe, The Effect of the Continuing Violations Theory on Title VII Back Pay Calculations,
13 SETON HALL L. REV. 262 (1983).
40. 589 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 975.
42. Id. at 977.
43. Id. at 976.
44. Id.
45. 564 F.2d 1073 (4th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 1077.
47. Id. at 1084-85.
48. 635 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1980).
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motion for summary judgment, finding that "the discriminatory violation
which gave rise to her claim occurred when she was hired [in 1969] at a lower
salary, and that her cause of action accrued on that date or, at the latest, upon
her discovery of the violation in 1975-76." 49 In a per curiam decision, the
Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the alleged discriminatory violation was
"a series of separate but related acts throughout the course of Jenkins'
employment" in that she received a paycheck every two weeks that was less
than that paid to males for the same work. 50 "Thus, the Company's alleged
discrimination was manifested in a continuing violation which ceased only at
the end of Jenkins' employment." 51 Assuming, as the district court stated,
that Ms. Jenkins' pay was set at the hiring date, and that this hiring rate caused
her salary to remain lower than comparably situated males, the liability
determination in this case on remand would turn on events occurring in 1969,
nearly nine years prior to her filing of the charge of discrimination. The
plaintiff would presumably be entitled to discover pay records of all
comparable male employees for the full period of her employment. Each pay
change for plaintiff and for each male would be scrutinized to determine its
effect, if any, on the resultant pay disparity observed within two years of her
charge. Explanations for each pay change (and, presumably, for each failure
to change pay) would be necessary. Moreover, the comparability of workloads
(the crux of plaintiff's claim) would also have to be examined for the entire
period. Even assuming the employer could reconstruct these thousands of
decisions, the lawsuit would have achieved disproportionate complexity
because of the removal of any effective stale claim bar. Clearly, cases such as
Jenkins do little to put an employer on prompt notice of a potential claim of
discrimination and hence do not foster voluntary compliance.
C. Standards for Application of the Theory
Application of the continuing violation doctrine has been inconsistent.
Unfortunately, appellate courts have not developed identifiable standards for
determining its proper scope and application. Whether the courts will
conclude that the array of events are separate, isolated incidents or a chain of
related occurrences extending into the limitations period cannot be predicted.
One court-the Fifth Circuit in Berry v. Board of Supervisors52-has
attempted to put this determination into an analytical framework. This
attempt is significant because it enunciates standards of general applicability
that are not in the conclusory terms so often invoked by appellate courts on
this subject. In Berry, the plaintiff was hired as an associate professor and
began work in August of 1975. She alleged that, at that time, she was
assigned substantially more work but was paid the same as comparable male
associate professors. In October of 1976, she was informed that her contract,
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id. at 312.
51. Id.
52. 715 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
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due to expire in May of 1977, would not be renewed. Her employment ended
May 21, 1977 and she filed a charge of discrimination (alleging violations of
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act) on October 12, 1977. 53
Reversing the district court's dismissal of her Title VII claim as untimely,
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether or not her
allegations constituted a sufficient showing of a continuing violation such as
to avoid the bar of the statute. 54 The court first attempted a general definition
of a continuing violation: "To establish a continuing violation for these
purposes, it is said that the plaintiff must show 'a series of related acts, one or
more of which falls within the 180 day period . . . .' 55 Next, the court
analyzed various characterizations of Berry's claim. After Ricks and Chardon, a
claim for wrongful termination was clearly untimely since her charge came
nearly one year after she was notified she would be terminated. 56 Similarly, a
claim for failure to rehire is usually considered a discrete, noncontinuing
event which must be the subject of a timely charge. 57 The court struggled
with the possibility that her salary claim (equal pay for more work) might be
continuing, citing Jenkins, but then noted that "not every case of unequal
salary resulting from discrimination presents a 'continuing violation'
situation."58 Noting that her salary claim was actionable under the Equal Pay
Act anyway, the court concluded that the thrust of her continuing violation
theory was on the work load discrimination theory: Berry alleged that her
additional work load was a condition that existed throughout her
employment. 59 Because neither the lower court nor the parties had focused
on this theory, the record was devoid of facts pertinent to the determination
of the existence of a continuing violation, and the Fifth Circuit accordingly
remanded, with the following observations and instructions:
This inquiry, of necessity, turns on the facts and context of each particular case.
Relevant to the determination are the following three factors, which we discuss, but by
no means consider to be exhaustive. The first is subject matter. Do the alleged acts
involve the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing
violation? The second is frequency. Are the alleged acts recurring (e.g., a biweekly
paycheck) or more in the nature of an isolated work assignment or employment
decision? The third factor, perhaps of most importance, is degree of permanence.
Does the act have the degree of permanence which should trigger an employee's
awareness of and duty to assert his or her rights, or which should indicate to the
employee that the continued existence of the adverse consequences of the act is to be
expected without being dependent on a continuing intent to discriminate? . . . As
noted, the particular context of individual employment situations requires a fact-
specific inquiry by a trial judge which cannot easily be reduced to a formula. We feel,
however, that consideration of the above factors will generally be appropriate, and we
53. Id. at 973-74.
54. Id. at 982-83.
55. Id. at 979 (citations omitted) (quoting Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1223 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978)).
56. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 980.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 980-81 (citing United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977)).
59. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.
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leave their application here, as well as whether trial on the merits is required for their
resolution, in the first instance to the district court.60
Of the three factors, it now appears that the first-same type of
discrimination-has been mandated by Havens.61 The third factor-degree of
permanence-is identified as the most important and will undoubtedly be the
crux of most cases. Analytically, it provides the framework for differentiating
cases which heretofore have been lumped together, such as failure to
promote, only because the same type of discrimination was involved. For
example, under Berry, if a specific vacancy occurs and the plaintiff is rejected
and so notified, a Ricks analysis will probably be applied, whereas a continuing
failure to upgrade a position (which does not depend on the existence of a
particular vacancy) may, because of the apparent lack of permanence to the
decision, be deemed to be continuing. From an evidentiary point, a stale
claim in the first example will present particular problems because facts
specific to that event are no longer fresh, whereas, in the second example, the
rationale for the failure to upgrade is presumably still applicable.
The final point of particular interest to the defense bar is the suggestion by
the Berry court that the determination of whether or not the continuing
violation doctrine is applicable will be a matter for the court. Thus, if the
suggestion is followed, where the facts relevant to the application of the
doctrine are not disputed, a preliminary resolution of the issue is possible,
avoiding at least in some cases the necessity of a trial on the merits.
D. Conclusion
Since Title VII encompasses any term or condition of employment,
employers are making potentially actionable decisions on a virtually
continuous basis. The plaintiff is free, under the continuing violation theory,
to reach back, not just weeks or months, but years to select the events which
he or she now deems to be significant, and about which the employer must
attempt to resurrect memories and records.
Moreover, in calculating the effect of unlawful acts or omissions alleged to have
occurred in the distant past, courts will, of necessity, be required to make factual
determinations based upon the vague recollections of witnesses and often incomplete
or nonexistent employer records. Such determinations could frequently result in
mere exercises in speculation. Accordingly, in enacting Title VII, Congress fixed
extremely short filing periods . . . apparently based in part on a desire to avoid
litigation of stale claims grounded on long-past events .... [A]ttempts to determine
an individual's career advancement over a period of ten or more years often becomes
not fact finding, but judicial speculation. It is submitted that such speculation is
unwarranted in light of Congress' firm resistance to extend Title VII's time limitations
beyond the short period now in force.
6 2
The Berry court has laid a workable foundation for evaluation of claims
under the continuing violation theory. The factors identified help focus the
analysis on the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Evans between
60. Id. at 981-82 (footnote omitted).
61. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381 (1982).
62. O'Keefe, supra note 39, at 288-89 (footnote omitted).
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continuing impact and a continuing, current violation.63 Building upon this
foundation, trial and appellate courts hopefully will be able to construct a
coherent body of law which will both protect the rights of employers not to be
subjected to stale claims and the rights of employees to challenge long
standing practices. By giving structure and definition to the theory, the courts
will foster predictability in its application, simultaneously reducing
unwarranted litigation and encouraging voluntary compliance.
III
PENDENT STATE CLAIMS
During the last few years, defendant employers have increasingly been
confronted with the phenomenon of plaintiffs appending state claims to their
employment discrimination claims under Title VII, section 1981, or the
ADEA in federal court suits. Thus, in a typical case where a female employee
is discharged, an employer today might expect not only a Title VII suit in
federal court, but also the appending to that federal claim of one or more
state claims such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful or
abusive discharge, or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The erosion in many states of the employment-at-will doctrine has
presented plaintiff's counsel with a variety of additional causes of action to
attach to the federal claim, especially in a discharge case. Even in states such
as North Carolina, where the employment-at-will doctrine continues to be
very much alive, 64 there are still available to plaintiff's counsel several
traditional state causes of action (for example, intentional infliction of
emotional distress), which can be appended to employment discrimination
claims in federal court.
The dilemma facing an employer when a state claim is appended to a
federal employment discrimination claim is this: Does the employer proceed
with the state claim appended to the federal employment discrimination claim
and run the risk that the evidence concerning the state claim will unduly
influence the federal claim, or should the employer defend two claims from
the plaintiff in two different forums (the state court action in state court and
the federal employment discrimination action in federal court)? Neither
choice is particularly attractive. Indeed, many employers would opt for the
first alternative strictly on the basis that defending two actions in different
forums would be more expensive.65 Most employers who have thought
through the entire process, however, seem to have decided that they would
rather take the risk of having to defend claims in two forums rather than
having federal employment discrimination claims commingled with state
claims, thereby virtually insuring that extrinsic factors that should not be
63. See United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
64. See, e.g., Nantz v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473,477, 226 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1976).
65. Such reasoning may be questionable given the potential for complications and confusion in
a federal trial where state claims are appended and the employer is really defending several different
lawsuits.
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considered will not greatly influence the federal claims. Thus, most
employers seek to have such pendent state court claims dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The article next examines the reasons for the proliferation of cases in
which plaintiffs append state claims to employment discrimination claims in
federal court, reviews the standards the federal courts have applied in
determining whether to allow such state claims to be appended, and discusses
some of the issues and problems which have arisen as a result of this trend.
A. Reasons for Appending State Claims
The reasons most often given for a plaintiff's attempt to append a state
claim to a Title VII or ADEA claim are that (1) traditional remedies under
federal employment discrimination statutes are inadequate and the state
claims provide additional potential remedies for the plaintiff; (2) plaintiff's
counsel may be concerned that the plaintiff has not met some of the
administrative prerequisites to suit under Title VII or the ADEA; and (3) by
appending the state claim, the plaintiff may be entitled to a jury trial, at least
as to the appended state claim and perhaps, in some instances, on all claims. 66
Consideration of several typical fact situations clarifies the reasoning of
plaintiffs' counsel in seeking to expand a federal employment discrimination
suit by appending a state claim. For example, a female employee who prevails
in a Title VII action in which she contends that she has been terminated
because of her sex is entitled, under traditional Title VII remedies, to
reinstatement, back pay,67 and costs (including reasonable attorney fees). 68
She is not entitled to a jury trial and may not recover compensatory and
punitive damages under Title VII. 69 In many instances, the discharge
circumstances are such that the plaintiff does not desire reinstatement,
especially if her case comes to trial two to three years after her termination
and if she has already obtained satisfactory employment elsewhere. By
appending a state claim of abusive discharge, the plaintiff is then entitled to a
jury trial at least on the state claim, and perhaps on all of her claims, 70 and
may seek both compensatory and punitive damages.
66. Plaintiffs who bring suit under the ADEA are entitled to a jury trial under that Act in any
event. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982). Similarly, in a race
discrimination case, the plaintiff can obtain a jury trial by seeking compensatory and punitive
damages and bringing his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Setser v. Novack Ins. Co., 638 F.2d
1137, 1140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981); see also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974). Although the Supreme Court has never squarely ruled on this issue, the circuits are of the
view that a party is not entitled to ajury trial under Title VII. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d
1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated
on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971).
67. Any back pay award will be taxed as "wages." Rev. Rul. 78-176, 1978-1 C.B. 303.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k) (1982).
69. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1975); Shah v. Mt. Zion
Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1981).
70. As noted by the court in Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, 625 F. Supp. 998 (D. Del. 1985),
"[allthough typically a plaintiff has no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a Title VII action,
when there are overlapping issues of law and equity, as here, with the breach of contract claims and
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Sexual harassment cases present an even clearer instance of why a plaintiff
would want to append a state claim to a Title VII claim. Under current law, a
victim of sexual harassment who cannot show that the harassment resulted in
the loss to her of any employment opportunity is probably only entitled,
under Title VII, to injunctive relief and her costs in bringing the action
including reasonable attorney's fees. 7' By adding a state claim for assault or
intentional infliction of emotional distress or both (and perhaps joining the
offending supervisor or coemployee as a defendant), the plaintiff has an
opportunity to recover compensatory and punitive damages as well as to
obtain a jury trial.
The ADEA, which may be more pliant in some ways, still limits available
remedies. An ADEA plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial. 72 While there are
indications that courts may be more flexible in fashioning additional remedies
under the ADEA than under Title VII (for example, front pay in lieu of
reinstatement), 73 compensatory and punitive damages are not available under
the ADEA. 74
The remedies afforded by state law are a great incentive to an employment
discrimination plaintiff in federal court to attempt to append state claims to
his federal claim. 75 A review of employment discrimination cases in the last
several years indicates that plaintiffs have not been reluctant to attempt to
expand their federal employment discrimination claims. The imagination of
plaintiffs' counsel in this area is made apparent by a review of the various
combinations of claims which are being filed. 76
B. Standards for Allowing Pendent State Claims to be Appended
to Federal Claims
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs 77 is the seminal case on the issue of whether a
federal court has jurisdiction to entertain state court claims appended to a
federal claim, and under what circumstances it should do so. Gibbs sued the
union in federal court, alleging that the union had brought improper pressure
the discrimination in termination claim, the right to a jury decision in the contract claim extends to
any issue of fact common to the breach of contract and Title VII actions." Id. at 1006 n.7; accord
Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521, 527 (D.N.J. 1981).
71. For a full discussion of remedies available to a sexual harassment victim under Title VII, see
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982).
73. See Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 700 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d
1003, 1023 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Note, Making Plaintiffs Whole: The Need for Front Pay Under the ADEA
and Other Antidiscrimination Statutes, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1986, at 239. But see Jaffee v.
Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1194, 1195 (D. Md. 1979).
74. Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1981); Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co.,
605 F.2d 128, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1979).
75. It has further been the experience of the authors' firm that state claims, with accompanying
exorbitant demands for compensatory and punitive damages, are often appended to federal
employment discrimination claims in order to increase the plaintiff's leverage for settlement
purposes.
76. For a sample listing of the various combinations of federal and state claims which plaintiffs
have advanced, see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 741-42 n.14.
77. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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on his employer to discharge him. 78 The plaintiff asserted not only a claim
under the Taft-Hartley Act, but also a state court claim of unlawful conspiracy
to interfere with his contract of employment. 79 The Supreme Court, although
holding for the union on the merits, expressly decided that there was pendent
jurisdiction to decide the state claim.8 0 The Gibbs Court noted that there
really were two issues to be decided-first, whether the federal court had the
power to entertain the pendent state claim and, second, if so, whether the
federal court properly exercised its discretion in asserting that jurisdiction.
On the first question, a unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Brennan,
said:
Pendent jursidiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim
"arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority .. .," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the
relationship between that claim and the state court claim permits the conclusion that
the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional "case." The
federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the court. [citations omitted] The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to
try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
8 1
Thus, if there is a substantial federal claim which gives the court jurisdiction,
there is power to hear pendent state claims that "derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact" if those claims are such that a plaintiff would
"ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."
This first issue-the power of a federal court to entertain pendent state
court claims-has not been a particularly troublesome one for the courts,
especially in the context of federal employment discrimination statutes.
Actions under those statutes certainly present a substantial federal claim, and
it is relatively simple to determine whether the pendent claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact." 82 Although there is a line of cases
considering the power issue in a different context in a Title VII situation and
concluding that Title VII, because of its unique judicial history and purpose,
reveals an implied congressional command negating pendent jurisdiction of
state claims, 83 the vast majority of cases are decided on the basis of the second
step of the Gibbs test.
After finding that a federal court has power to exercise jurisdiction over
pendent state claims under the specific guidelines, the Gibbs Court then clearly
78. Id. at 720.
79. Id. at 717-18, 720.
80. Id. at 725-29.
81. Id. at 725 (emphasis in original).
82. The requirements that there be a common nucleus of operative fact and that the claims be
such that they would ordinarily be expected to be tried in a single proceeding are generally thought
to be cumulative. See 13B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3567.1, at 116 (1984).
83. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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indicated that the exercise of such pendent jurisdiction in a particular case is
committed to the sound discretion of the district court:
That power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has
consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not
of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims .... Needless decisions of state law
should be avoided, both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law .... [I]f it
appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, the
scope of the issues raised, or the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state
claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tribunals. 84
The following factors, gleaned from Gibbs and from subsequent cases
and authorities applying Gibbs to employment discrimination cases, are
traditionally considered in determining whether or not the federal court
should exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims:
(1) Whether adjoining the state claim would require additional parties not
necessary for the federal claim;
(2) Whether the state claim presents an unsettled or novel issue of state law;8 5
(3) Whether the state claim would so dominate the trial that the federal claim
would become a mere appendage;
(4) Whether different statutes of limitation, elements of proof, and remedies are
at issue in the state claim than in the federal claim;
(5) Whether the state claim is the only one on which a jury trial is available or
requested;
(6) The likelihood of confusion to a jury by appending the state claim;
(7) Considerations of judicial economy; and
(8) Considerations of convenience and fairness to the litigants.
As might be expected, application of the above standards in employment
discrimination cases has led to widely divergent trial court decisions, all of
which are only subject to reversal by an appellate court if an abuse of
discretion is found.8 6 A detailed comparison of two 1983 district court
decisions best illustrates the different jurisprudential approaches leading to
different results in similar cases. In Frykberg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co., 87 the plaintiff brought a Title VII action alleging discrimination,
harassment, and constructive discharge by the defendants on account of her
sex. She also appended a state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for which she sought compensatory and punitive
damages. 88 The defendant moved to dismiss the state court claim, arguing,
inter alia: (1) that the compensatory and punitive damages being sought
84. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
85. For example, if a plaintiff suing under Title VII sought to append a state court claim of
abusive discharge in a state in which it was unclear whether or not such a cause of action was
cognizable, this factor would be a strong argument that a federal court should not exercise pendent
jurisdiction.
86. Schlei and Grossman illustrate the divergent results under these factors on virtually
indistinguishable facts. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 11, at 89-90 n.3, 741-42 n. 14 (2d ed.
1983 & Supp. 1983).
87. 557 F. Supp. 517 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
88. Id. at 517.
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under the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim were not available
under Title VII and were therefore more comprehensive than the remedies
provided under federal law; (2) that different elements of proof were involved
in the state claim, whose issues would predominate over the issues related to
the federal claim; (3) that the state claim, but not the federal claim, would be
tried to a jury; and (4) that the law of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in North Carolina was unsettled and consequently, that interpretation
of such law should be left to the state courts. 89 The federal district judge, in
denying the defendant's motion and allowing the state claim to be appended
to the federal claim, found that the advantages of trying all of the plaintiff's
claims in one action, thereby furthering the interests of convenience and
judicial economy, far outweighed the factors advanced by the defendant. The
district court dismissed the defendant's arguments with regard to splitting the
state and federal claims between jury and nonjury trials by stating that
"[t]rying state claims to a jury and federal claims to a court makes no big deal
of the case. Jury trials here frequently take less time and are cheaper than
non-jury trials." 90 The court further indicated that it might decide to use the
jury in an advisory capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) with
respect to the nonjury claim.9' While acknowledging that the state court issue
might adduce some additional evidence and that additional relief was being
sought under that claim, the court determined that the state court issues did
not "substantially predominate" over the federal issues. 92 Noting that the
North Carolina Supreme Court had recently defined the scope and elements
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court indicated
that it felt the law in North Carolina on the subject of intentional infliction of
emotional distress was clear and gave that element little weight.93
In Kelly v. Western Air Lines,94 the plaintiff brought an action under the
ADEA as a result of his discharge by the defendant. Plaintiff sought to
append actions for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The defendant moved to dismiss the three state law causes of action. 95 After
reciting the Gibbs criteria, the district judge, in his discretion, declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the state claims. In the view of the court, exercise of
pendent jurisdiction would not "advance judicial economy" because the
considerations underlying the state claims were substantially different than
those underlying the ADEA action. Noting that it would always be more
convenient to try all the issues in one forum, the federal judge stated that
"[tihat factor alone is insufficient to mandate exercise of pendent
89. Id. at 518.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 518-19.
93. Id. at 519-20.
94. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1082 (D. Utah 1983).
95. Id. at 1083.
Page 25: Autumn 1986]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
jurisdiction." 96 The court gave considerable weight to the various arguments
of the defendant: (1) the unsettled nature of the state causes of action,
especially the actions for wrongful discharge and breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, indicated that a "proper degree of comity to the
state court system" required that those matters be left to initial determination
by a state court; (2) the state issues appeared to predominate substantially
both in terms of proof and the scope of the issues raised; (3) the facts
necessary to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress were quite
different from those required to prove violations of the ADEA and therefore
significant potential for jury confusion existed; and (4) the scope of relief
sought in the state court actions was far greater than under the ADEA. 97
The one firm conclusion to be drawn from a review of employment
discrimination cases interpreting Gibbs is that the greatest single factor which
will determine the issue of whether a state claim may be appended to an
employment discrimination case is the philosophy of the district court judge.
Other courts, while acknowledging that they have the power to entertain
appended state court claims under the first prong of the Gibbs test, have held
that Title VII and its judicial history reveal an implied congressional
command negating pendent jurisdiction in Title VII based actions. 98 These
cases (which will be referred to collectively as the Mongeon-Wescott line of
cases) reasoned that while Gibbs delineated the limits of federal judicial power
under article III of the Constitution, subsequent Supreme Court cases
indicated that acknowledgement of the existence of article III power does not
end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the nonfederal
claims along with the federal ones. 99 Beyond the "constitutional minimum,"
[T]here must be an examination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is
asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in
order to determine whether "Congress in [that statute] has ... expressly or by
implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal
claim. 10o
The Mongeon-Wescott line of cases concluded that, under Aldinger v.
Howard 1 0 1 and Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 10 2 the federal courts
must, before considering the discretionary factors set forth in Gibbs, consider
whether the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction in question, either expressly
or by implication, excluded the state claim from federal court jurisdiction. All
of those cases concluded that Title VII's legislative history revealed an
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1083-84.
98. E.g., Mongeon v. Shellcraft Indus., 590 F. Supp. 956 (D. Vt. 1984); Wescott v. Wackenhut
Corp., 581 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1983); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., 555 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C.
1983); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F. Supp. 115 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Jong-Yul
Lim v. International Inst., 510 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Kiss v. Tamarac Util., 463 F. Supp.
951 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
99. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371-73 (1978); Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976).
100. Owen Equip., 437 U.S. at 373 (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18).
101. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
102. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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implied congressional command negating pendent jurisdiction in Title VII
based actions.' 0 3 Among the factors considered by the Mongeon-Wescott courts
in reaching this determination concerning Title VII were the following: 04
(1) The relief which Congress has provided under Title VII is equitable in nature,
including only reinstatement and back pay. The statutory exclusion of legal remedies
under Title VII reveals a congressional desire to restrict the type of relief awarded in
discrimination claims brought under the statute. Joinder of state law claims, under
which a plaintiff might be entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, directly
conflicts with the congressional intent of limited relief under Title VII.' 0 5
(2) Several procedural provisions of Title VII strongly support the finding of a
congressional negation of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Title VII cases are
tried by a judge, not a jury; also, Title VII indicates a clear congressional policy that
Title VII cases are to be given preference and adjudicated as promptly as possible.' 0 6
To consider state contract and tort claims in a Title VII action would conflict with
these policies by expanding the scope of issues to be resolved and by making those
issues resolvable by ajury, all of which would undoubtedly result in delay in trying the
claims. '0
7
(3) When additional defendants are named in the state claim who were not
named in the EEOC charge or the Title VII suit (as is often the case), the public policy
favoring cooperation and voluntary compliance as the preferred means for eliminating
discrimination in the area of employment opportunities is subverted since the
additional defendants in the nonfederal claim have not been involved in any
conciliation process. 108
Although most federal courts have not considered the reasoning of the
Mongeon- Wescott line of cases but have immediately gone from step one to step
two under the Gibbs test to examine the various discretionary factors in
determining whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claims, in
view of the Aldinger and Owen Supreme Court cases (which were decided
subsequent to Gibbs), federal courts should address the issues raised in the
Mongeon-Wescott cases. Alternatively, the Mongeon-Wescott line of cases held
that even if their interpretation of Aldinger and Owen were incorrect, an
application of the Gibbs discretionary factors would also lead to a declination
of pendent jurisdiction.' 0 9 Such an "alternative" approach suggests that even
if a district court does not follow the Mongeon-Wescott rationale completely, the
factors mentioned in those cases should be afforded great weight in applying
the discretionary factors outlined in Gibbs.
C. Jury Trial Issues
The current circuit court view is that while there is no right to ajury trial in
Title VII actions, there is a right to a jury trial under the ADEA and section
103. See, e.g., Mongeon v. Shellcraft Indus., 590 F. Supp. at 958-60 (D. Vt. 1984); Wescott v.
Wackenhut Corp., 581 F. Supp. at 9 (S.D. Cal. 1983).
104. While all of the Mongeon-Wescott cases were Title VII cases, the same policy considerations
which led to those decisions should apply in ADEA actions.
105. E.g., Wescott, 581 F. Supp. at 10; Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., 555 F. Supp. 730, 734
(D.S.C. 1983).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982).
107. E.g., Mongeon, 590 F. Supp. at 959-60; Frye, 555 F. Supp. at 733-34.
108. E.g., Frye, 555 F. Supp. at 734 ; Kiss v. Tamarac Util., 463 F. Supp. 951, 953-54 (S.D. Fla.
1978).
109. E.g., Mongeon, 590 F. Supp. at 960-61; Frye, 555 F. Supp. at 735-36.
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1981 claims where compensatory and punitive damages are sought. 0 A
federal court's decision to exercise pendent jurisdiction over appended state
claims, however, may affect the availability of a jury trial.
In a situation where a nonjury federal claim (for example, a Title VII
claim) has appended to it a state claim which does carry the right to ajury trial
(for example, assault or slander), and both claims arise out of the same
operative facts, there is considerable authority for the proposition that the
right to ajury trial exists on "all issues common to both claims."'' In the
typical case of a pendent state (legal) claim being appended to a Title VII
(equitable) claim, many, if not all, of the issues will be common to both claims.
Indeed, under Gibbs, the power of the federal court to entertain the state court
claim in the first instance arises only if the state court claim arises out of a
"common nucleus of operative fact." There have been several cases which
have applied the Curtis v. Loether 112 rationale, which would permit juries to
decide all issues common to both claims, to allow jury trials on issues common
to Title VII and section 1981 claims (where "legal" damages are sought under
section 1981)."1 Some federal courts have indicated that they might have a
jury both decide the state claims and act as an advisory jury on the Title VII
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c). 114 Whether such a
procedure would pass constitutional muster is questionable in a situation
where Curtis v. Loether principles would mandate a jury trial on all issues
common to both claims.
D. Conclusion
Although many federal district courts have utilized the discretion afforded
them in Gibbs to expand federal jurisdiction, Gibbs itself clearly recognized the
basic constitutional precept that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction.1 15 Gibbs placed the burden on the plaintiff to show the article III
power of the federal court and to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the
federal district court that concerns of convenience, judicial economy, and
fairness were so great that the trial court should exercise its discretion in favor
of accepting jurisdiction over pendent state claims. The cardinal principle
that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction is especially important in
the area of federal employment discrimination cases for the reasons set forth
in the Mongeon-Wescott line of cases. Concepts which are basic to the structure
of Title VII and the ADEA are jeopardized when a jury, or even a federal
110. See supra note 66.
111. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.l 1 (1974); see also Beacon Theatres v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959). The Beacon Theatres and Curtis principles apply, of course, only where there
are issues common to both the legal and the equitable claim.
112. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
113. SeeJones v. Metropolitan Hosp. & Health Centers, 88 F.R.D. 341 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Clarke
v. American Cyanamid Co., 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,645 (D.N.J. 1980); Page v. Schlumberger
Well Serv., 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,104 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Tucker v. Harley Davidson Motor
Co., 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 9,111 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
114. See, e.g., Frykberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 557 F. Supp. 517, 518 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
115. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 82, § 3522, at 60 (1984).
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district court judge, is subjected to evidence concerning compensatory and
punitive damages, pain and suffering, emotional distress, and so forth, at the
same time that it is considering a Title VII or ADEA claim. The spillover
effect of that type of evidence on the Title VII or ADEA claim is inevitable and
is inconsistent with a statutory scheme where every effort was made to remove
those emotional factors from consideration. If Congress deems that the
remedies under Title VII and the ADEA are inadequate, it is the appropriate
entity to deal with that issue. Federal district courts, however, should not
undermine important congressional considerations concerning the
appropriate atmosphere for trial of a federal employment discrimination case
and ignore the basic concept of limited federal court jurisdiction in the name
of expediency.
IV
THE CHILLING EFFECT OF DOUBLE ATrORNEYS' FEES
A defendant in an employment discrimination action is faced with an
expensive lawsuit with virtually no chance of recovering his expenses even
when he prevails. The risk of an adverse judgment is substantial, given the
complexity and fluidity of the law. If the defendant loses the action on a
substantial point, he has threshold expenses to fear: payment of plaintiff's
attorneys' fees; his own attorneys' fees; and the vast man-hour expenses
involved in preparing his defense, answering interrogatories, attending
depositions, obtaining the service of experts, and other case preparation. The
costs to the defendant are especially high if the suit is a class action.
As a result, many practices that were never considered by Congress to be
in violation of the discrimination acts may be abandoned without contest
solely due to cost. A prudent employer, confronted with the substantial
financial risks inherent in defending his labor practices, may conform them,
not to the construction of the acts rendered by the courts, but to a reading of
the acts that avoids these threshold risks. For many defendants, settlement-
even of nonmeritorious claims-may be the most economical avenue
available. The number of defendants otherwise disposed to defend their
practices, but deterred by double attorneys' fees and the high cost of
litigation, is probably extensive.' 16
This situation applies to small, medium, and large defendants alike.
Although a small defendant has fewer employees to originate discrimination
claims, the impact of a lawsuit in the federal court can bear heavily on its
limited human and financial resources. A large defendant has many more
employees who may be induced to file a claim and seek recovery in the courts,
with a correspondingly heavier risk factor.
116. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 n. 20 (1978) ("The other side
of this coin is the fact that many defendants in Title VII claims are small and moderate size employers
for whom the expense of defending even a frivolous claim may become a strong disincentive to the
exercise of their legal rights.").
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This section of the article will examine the proposition that the award of
substantial attorneys' fees and litigation expenses' 17 to a prevailing plaintiff
encourages employment discrimination litigation in a manner not
contemplated by Congress. The more incentive a complainant has to sue, the
more likely it is that he will disregard a finding of no probable cause by the
EEOC, efforts to conciliate his claim by the EEOC, or offers by his employer
to settle his claim short of resorting to the courts.
Justice Powell, speaking of section 1988 (which allows a "prevailing party"
in section 1981, 1983, and 1985 cases to recover attorneys' fees) in his
dissenting opinion in Pulliam v. Allen, 118 observed:
Finally, harassing litigation and its potential for intimidation increases in suits where
the prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees. Perhaps for understandable
reasons, the Court's opinion passes lightly over the effect of § 1988. In fact, that
provision has become a major additional source of litigation. Since its enactment in
1976, suits against state officials under § 1983 have increased geometrically. Congress
enacted § 1988 for the specific purpose of facilitating and encouraging citizens of
limited means to obtain counsel to pursue § 1983 remedies. But sections 1983 and
1988 are available regardless of the financial ability of a plaintiff to engage private
counsel. The lure of substantial fee awards, now routinely made to prevailing § 1983 plaintiffs,
assures that lawyers will not be reluctant to recommend and press these suits. 119
Formerly, civil rights plaintiffs could pursue private enforcement of their
claims only insofar as their wealth permitted.' 20 The prevailing party in
American federal litigation is, absent statutory authorization or enforceable
contract, not ordinarily entitled to recover attorneys' fees from the losing
party. 1 2 ' Attorneys' fees are currently available, however, to prevailing
litigants in employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII,' 2 2 in
actions brought under the ADEA,12 3 and in actions brought under sections
117. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984):
Since the oral argument of this appeal, this court, joining the other circuits that have considered
the question, has held that expenses of litigation that are distinct from either statutory costs or
the costs of the lawyer's time reflected in his hourly billing rates-expenses for such things as
postage, long-distance calls, xeroxing, travel, paralegals, and expert witnesses-are part of the
reasonable attorney's fee allowed by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.
Id. at 1203.
118. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
119. Id. at 555-56 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The same
reasoning would apply in Title VII and ADEA cases.
120. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); see also Christiansburg, 434 U.S.
at 417. In Newman, a Title II action, the Court stated that "if successful plaintiffs were routinely
forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the
public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts." 390 U.S. at 402. The Court
stated in Christiansburg that "[i]n Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, the Court made clear that
the Piggie Park standard of awarding attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff is equally applicable in an
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act." 434 U.S. at 417.
121. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
123. Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, incorporated by reference into the ADEA by
§ 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976), provides: "The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the
defendant and costs of action." This language has been interpreted as precluding an award of
attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant. See Richardson v. Alaska Airlines, 750 F.2d 763, 766 (9th
Cir. 1984); Fellows v. Medford Corp., 16 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 764, 768 (D. Ore. 1978).
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1981 and 1983 through the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
(section 1988).124 Together these comprehensive provisions provide the
statutory foundation for fee shifting in virtually all private civil rights
litigation.
Congress expressed concern that fee shifting provisions would encourage
barratry-proliferation of frivolous suits initiated to generate statutory fees-
during its consideration of section 1988.125 Critics of the provision argued
that section 1988 would provide "bonanzas to the legal profession" and a
"relief fund for lawyers."1 26
The importance of fee shifting in employment discrimination actions has
been demonstrated by the fact that four attorneys' fees cases have been
litigated in the Supreme Court in recent terms.
The first case grew out of a black female's application for work at the New
York Gaslight Club. 127 She was denied employment and she filed a charge
with the EEOC alleging that the defendant had denied her a position because
of her race. As required by section 706(c) of Title VII, plaintiff's complaint
was forwarded to the New York State Division of Human Rights. The plaintiff
ultimately prevailed in the state proceedings, but prior to their conclusion she
filed a suit in the federal district court, alleging that defendant did not hire her
because she was black. By consent, the federal action was dismissed upon the
favorable ruling in the state court except for plaintiff's request for attorneys'
fees for the time spent both in the federal court and in the state
proceedings. 128 The plaintiff was held to be the "prevailing party" within the
meaning of section 706(k), and consequently was entitled to an award of
attorney fees "for work done at the state and local levels" as well as in the
federal court. ' 29
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 130 the issue was whether a partially prevailing
plaintiff may recover attorneys' fees for legal services on unsuccessful claims.
[T]he extent of a plaintiff's success is a crucial factor in determining the proper
amount of an award of attorney's fees .... [W]here the plaintiff has failed to prevail
on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on
the unsuccessful claims should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable
fee . . . . [W]here a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won
substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply because the district
court did not adopt each contention raised. But where the plaintiff achieved only
limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees that is
reasonable in relation to the results obtained.131
In the third case to come before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs in a
section 1983 action were represented by attorneys from The Legal Aid
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
125. 122 CONG. REC. 31,474 (1976).
126. Id. at 33,314 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
127. New York Gaslight, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
128. Id. at 56-59.
129. Id. at 63.
130. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
131. Id. at 440.
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Society of New York, a private nonprofit law office.' 32 The court decided that
reasonable fees under section 1988 are to be calculated according to the
prevailing market rates in the relevant community regardless of whether the
prevailing party is represented by private or nonprivate counsel. 3 3 An
upward adjustment of attorneys' fees would be permissible under section
1988, but under the circumstances of the present case, a fifty percent upward
adjustment was not justified. 3 4
Two individuals brought a section 1983 suit against a state magistrate in
Pulliam v. Allen, '35 the fourth case to come before the Supreme Court. The
plaintiffs claimed that the magistrate's practice of imposing bail on persons
arrested for nonjailable offenses under state law and of incarcerating those
persons if they could not meet bail was unconstitutional. The district court
enjoined the practice and also awarded the plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees
under section 1988. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the
defendant's appeal and the Supreme Court affirmed the award.' 3 6
A. Liberality in Determination of Prevailing Plaintiff and Fee Awards
In a civil rights action, the plaintiff need not prevail on all claims asserted
in the complaint in order to be the "prevailing party" for the purposes of a fee
award. Thus, the Supreme Court pointed out in Hensley v. Eckerhart 137 that
the standard for determining initially whether a plaintiff was a "prevailing
party" so as to be entitled to recover attorney fees has been framed in various
ways, and stated: "A typical formulation [of the determination] is that
'plaintiffs may be considered "prevailing parties" for attorney's fees purposes
if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.' "138
Where several plaintiffs are involved, where several different acts of
discrimination are alleged to have taken place, and where both injunctive and
monetary awards are sought, some of the plaintiffs will probably be
considered to be "prevailing parties" and, therefore, entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees.
"The initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee is properly calculated
by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
times a reasonable hourly rate."1 39 In addition to this "lodestar" sum,
"[a]djustments to that fee then may be made as necessary in the particular
case."' 40 However, the court observed that the legislative history of section
1988 "explains that 'a reasonable attorney's fee' is one that is 'adequate to
132. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
133. Id. at 894.
134. Id. at 901-02.
135. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
136. Id.
137. 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
138. Id. at 433 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).
139. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984).
140. Id.
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attract competent counsel, but . . . [that does] not produce windfalls to
attorneys.' ",141 Accordingly, an upward adjustment should be reserved for
cases of exceptional success rather than the norm.
In the 1960's and 1970's, the amounts of attorneys' fees awarded to
prevailing parties in employment discrimination suits were, for the most part,
modest and could be borne by most defendants without undue burden. 42
However, with the passage of time, the size of attorneys' fees for prevailing
plaintiffs has increased to the point that they now represent a significant factor
in the burden of defending these actions in the federal courts. Examples of
this upward trend in attorneys' fees follow.
In Pulliam v. Allen, 143 a section 1983 action brought against a state
magistrate, the district court held that the defendant magistrate's practice of
imposing bail on persons arrested for nonjailable offenses under Virginia law
and of incarcerating those persons if they could not meet the bail was
unconstitutional, and enjoined the practice. Although the court held that the
magistrate was immune from a judgment for damages, it awarded the plaintiff
attorneys' fees in the amount of $7,038.00. The Supreme Court affirmed the
award of attorneys' fees. Justice Powell, in dissent, pointed out that "[t]he
lure of substantial fee awards . . .now routinely made to prevailing § 1983
plaintiffs, assures that lawyers will not be reluctant to recommend and press
these suits.'" 144 In support of this statement, Justice Powell pointed out that
"[rlecent fee awards under § 1988 have increased with the precipitous rise in
hourly rates." 145 Justice Powell further noted that the burdens of litigation do
not necessarily end when a district court approves a fee as reasonable, since a
request for additional fees will probably be made for services rendered in the
appellate courts. "Regrettably, disputes over the reasonableness of § 1988
fee awards often become the major issue in the entire litigation."i' 46
In another instance of high attorneys' fees, female employee plaintiffs in a
sex discrimination class action recovered a substantial monetary award and
injunctive relief.147 Counsel for the parties were unable to negotiate the
amount of attorneys' fees and expenses that should be awarded to the
plaintiffs. The attorneys for the plaintiffs, who had successfully litigated the
merits of the action, retained another law firm to negotiate and, if necessary,
litigate the attorneys' fee award. Following extensive hearings, the district
court awarded plaintiffs $3,469,829. This award reflected a lodestar of
$1,471,241 on the merits, a doubling of that lodestar to account for the "risk
141. Id. at 897 (quoting S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976)).
142. See Heinsz, Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Solution, 8 YALE
LJ. 259, 268 n.45 (1977).
143. 466 U.S. 522 (1984).
144. Id. at 556 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
145. Id. at 556 n.17. In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 899 (1984), for example, hourly rates of
$95 to $105 for second- and third-year associates were found to be "prevailing rates" in the
community.
146. Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 556 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 746 F.2d 4, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Page 25: Autumn 1986]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
premium," an attorneys' fee lodestar of $194,324 and costs and expenses of
$216,972.148
The court of appeals held that the fee award must be recalculated
according to the market rates established by the law firms in their everyday
practice rather than the rates charged by firms in the community.' 49 The
court pertinently observed with respect to the claimed fee award by plaintiffs'
attorneys:
[M]ore attorneys worked on the fee request than ever worked on the merits, and more
hours were billed on the fee request than were billed in any given year on the merits.
We are, quite frankly, aghast at the hours devoted to the fee request. The award of
fees for 3,400 hours of attorney time shows clearly that this fee request did turn into
just the sort of "second major litigation" feared by both this and the Supreme Court;
the prodigious consumption of lawyers' hours and judicial time should give pause to
anyone concerned with the allocation of legal resources.
1 5 0
Nearly two million dollars in attorneys' fees and costs were awarded
plaintiffs in a class action brought against the University of Minnesota for
engaging in employment discrimination based upon sex and national
origin.151 Successfuljob bias claimants were awarded a total of $1,983,098 in
attorneys' fees, to be paid by the defendant employer in Chrapliny v. Uniroyal,
Inc. 152 This amount was arrived at as follows:
1. District court lodestar figure $1,547,471.00
2. Quality award $ 100,000.00
3. Risk award $ 50,000.00
4. Total district court award $1,697,471.00
5. Award for litigation before $ 285,627.22
the court of appeals
6. Total award $1,983,098.22153
The published decisions of awards to prevailing plaintiffs in a number of
employment discrimination cases amply demonstrate that Congress does not
have to be concerned that this field of litigation does not "attract competent
counsel" for any person who has a meritorious claim. Any person with a mer-
itorious claim will have little difficulty in finding a competent attorney to rep-
resent him.
B. The High Risk Factor in Class Actions
In class actions brought under the employment discrimination acts, the
cost of litigation to the defendant assumes even higher proportions. The
larger the number of employees in the putative class, the greater the cost
exposure to the defendant. Generally, class actions are bifurcated and if
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id. at 29.
151. Rajender v. University of Minn., 546 F. Supp. 158, 173 (D. Minn. 1982).
152. 583 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
153. Id. at 52.
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liability is established at the stage one proceedings, then the defendant must
bear the high cost of the proceedings at stage two, which are conducted
before a special master. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs at stage two proceedings
will normally be the "prevailing party," the defendant will be required to pay
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, its own attorneys' fees, costs of notification to
the class, transcripts of court proceedings and the special master's fee for such
proceedings. 154
The extent of this problem is demonstrated by the order in Kyriazi v.
Western Electric Co., 155 a sex discrimination action brought against an employer
by a female employee. Following determination of liability, the district court
held that: (1) a finding of class-wide discrimination shifted the burden to the
defendant employer to prove that any individual class member was not
discriminated against,' 56 (2) the defendant would be required to bear the
costs of notice to the class members, 57 and (3) backpay awards would be
computed on an individual basis by three appointed special masters who
would hear the claims of 10,000 potential claimants.' 58 One master would be
paid an hourly rate of $125 and two would be paid at hourly rates of $115.' 5 9
C. Different Fee Standards Apply to Prevailing Defendants
A defendant who is the "prevailing party" in an employment
discrimination action cannot reasonably expect to recover its attorneys' fees
from the unsuccessful plaintiff because the courts apply different standards in
such instances. The Supreme Court in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC'
60
stated that "a district court may, in its discretion, award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation .... ",, Because
of the potential chilling effect that fee awards may have on plaintiffs, the court
identified the fee award as a conservative tool, to be used sparingly in those
cases in which the plaintiff presses a claim which he knew or should have
known was groundless, frivolous, or unreasonable. 162 The district courts have
obeyed the admonition of the Supreme Court and have only sparingly
awarded fees to a successful defendant.
Even when the defendant is awarded attorneys' fees from the plaintiff, it is
faced with two additional obstacles. First, in appropriate circumstances,
district courts are admonished to give weight to the relative financial positions
154. See, e.g., Sledge v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978); Stastny v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 458 F. Supp. 314 (W.D.N.C. 1978).
155. 465 F. Supp. 1141 (D.N.J. 1979).
156. Id. at 1144.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1146-47.
159. Id. at 1148.
160. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
161. Id. at 421.
162. Id. at 422.
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of the litigants.' 63 Some courts reason that the policy of deterring frivolous
suits is not served by forcing the misguided Title VII plaintiff into financial
ruin simply because he prosecuted a groundless case.164 In Arnold v. Burger
King Corp., 165 where a modest fee award by the district court to the prevailing
defendants was affirmed on appeal, the court noted that "the financial
position of the plaintiff is but one among the several other relevant factors
which a trial judge should consider," and "the trial court has broad discretion
to reduce the fee award in light of mitigating factors, such as the difficulty of
the case, the motivation of the plaintiff, and the relative economic status of the
litigants." 166 Second, most fee awards allowed against unsuccessful plaintiffs
are not collectible. This is particularly true in actions brought by wage
earners and pro se plaintiffs.
V
CONCLUSION
The prospect of increased litigation in the employment discrimination
field is enhanced by the reorganization plan approved by the EEOC in
February, 1984. Under this plan, the EEOC is, through its Expanded
Presence Program, reaching out into less urbanized areas where traditionally
there has not been much EEOC-related activity. The EEOC is now sending
teams of its personnel into specific areas not currently convenient to EEOC
offices. These visits will be preceded by announcements and media coverage.
These teams are receiving EEOC charges, assisting individuals in drafting
EEOC charges, and meeting with local groups or individuals to educate them
regarding the antidiscrimination requirements of the various acts enforced by
the EEOC. Such a program will undoubtedly heighten awareness, both of the
substantive law and the procedures for enforcement, resulting in more
charges of discrimination, particularly against employers heretofore largely
ignored.
Based on prior experience, this new program will undoubtedly result in
increased litigation and defendants should be afforded some reasonable
protection from the seemingly endless streams of unfounded, and often stale,
lawsuits brought against them. The Supreme Court acknowledged in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC167 that Congress, by the enactment of
section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "wanted to protect defendants
from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis," and identified
this purpose as having roughly the same importance as the congressional goal
of encouraging plaintiffs to challenge invidious employment practices. 68 It
163. See, e.g., Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., 678 F.2d 911, 917 (11th Cir. 1982); Faraci v.
Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028 (2d Cir. 1979).
164. Farad, 607 F.2d at 1028.
165. 719 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1984).
166. Id. at 68.
167. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
168. Id. at 420.
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remains to be seen whether defendants are to be afforded this protection
during the 1980's.

